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 Chapter 3 
 
Complex Decision-Making Process of 
Infrastructure Investment in Indonesian 




      
3.1 Introduction 
 
Although discussions on the effect of infrastructure on the economy 
are interesting for both scholars and policymakers, infrastructure 
planning and decision making are, in fact, not simple processes. 
Decision making for infrastructure such as building roads, ports, and 
other major public works is becoming more complex. The issues that 
need to be considered are not only technical and economic, but also 
environmental and political. 
There is a trend all over the world for citizen involvement in 
decision making. In line with this trend, governments are exploring 
different types of planning and decision making that consider the 
increased interdependency of actors. Concepts such as interactive 
planning, network management, stakeholder dialogue, community 
governance, open-planning procedures, and participatory planning 
have emerged (see, for example, Arts & Tatenhove, 2005; Edelenbos 
& Klijn, 2006; Woltjer, 2002). 
In the present globalized era, we live in a networked society. Any 
policy, any strategy, any human project, has to consider this basic 
fact (Castells, 2006). It is little wonder that decision making has 
become more complex. Problems cannot be solved by organizations on 
their own. As a consequence, hierarchy as an organizational principle 
has lost much of its meaning, with horizontal networks replacing 
hierarchies (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). As Birkland (2001) said, 
intuitively we can understand that actors in the policy process can 
and must interact with each other to advance policy proposals. 
Without this interaction, nothing would happen, and policymaking 
would come to a standstill. Organizations and individuals who are 
participants in complex decision problems interact in an environment 
in which conditions are often changing rapidly and unpredictably, 
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which increases the uncertainty experienced by participants dealing 
with decision problems (Radford, 1978). 
These issues not only affect developed countries but also 
countries in transition like Indonesia, which have become 
democratized. Reform occurs not only in the political system but also 
in public administration and public finance, together with a 
decentralization policy. Even though discussions on new perspectives 
on decision making usually take place in Western countries, it is 
quite interesting to explore the possibility of using a variety of 
analytical approaches in a newly democratic country such as 
Indonesia, where the concept of participatory planning and citizen 
involvement has been growing (see, for example, Dasgupta & Beard, 
2007; Timothy, 1999). However, it is also important to note that 
political, sociocultural, and economic environments in Indonesia are 
different from those in Western countries.  
The purpose of this study is to understand the complexity of the 
decision-making process in infrastructure investment in Indonesia, 
particularly in PPP arrangements: to understand to what extent this 
complexity actually exists and how the government as a key actor 
deals with these new environments. The researcher uses a network 
perspective as a framework for study and the Rounds Model 
(Teisman, 2000) as a point of departure to analyze the complexity of 
decision making in infrastructure investment. The study contributes 
to the discussion on complexity in the context of developing countries 
with reference to the configuration of actors in the policy network. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the 
theoretical framework that underlies the analysis, emphasizing the 
network approach. Section 3.3 presents the research methodology, 
and section 3.4 describes the research context of the study: 
Indonesian infrastructure development and policy. This section also 
describes the Indonesian policy on PPP. Section 3.5 presents four 
case studies on infrastructure projects in Indonesia. This is followed 
by interpretive readings and a discussion in section 3.6. Section 3.7 
draws conclusions. 
 
3.2 Theoretical Framework and Model 
 
This section describes the decision-making process for infrastructure 
investment. To start with, the theoretical background is outlined and 
then the analytical model. Process analysis and decision-making 
process analysis receive a lot of attention in the field of political 
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sciences and public administration. Theoretical developments in 
those academic disciplines have made a valuable contribution to 
researchers working with planning and policymaking to cope with 
environment and spatial issues and problems.  
In analyzing decision making, the researcher needs to reconstruct 
the study object. Decision making cannot be depicted without making 
assumptions about its appearance (Teisman, 2000). Terms such as 
framework and model have been used to define approaches to 
address the topic of policy process analysis. Models of a policy process 
can help us to learn what is most important in the policy process 
(Birkland, 2001).  
Various approaches have been developed as a foundation for 
either a policy process or a decision-making process analysis. 
Sabatier (1991) noted that there are four frameworks: the open-
systems framework of Richard Hofferbert, an approach involving 
rational actors within institutions developed by Elinor Ostrom and 
her colleagues, John Kingdon's "policy streams" framework, and his 
own "advocacy coalition" framework. In addition to those 
frameworks, there are also more models like Birkland (2001), who 
noted the garbage can model developed by Michael Cohen, James 
March, and Johan Olsen (1972). Teisman (2000) elaborates on three 
models: phases, streams, and rounds. Monnikhof (2006) reviews four 
models and their relevance to the Netherlands: network theory, 
garbage can and stream theory, the rounds model, and the advocacy 
coalition framework.  
Each framework or model has its own assumptions. Readers 
should also note that researchers have developed these models based 
on case studies in developed countries. Therefore, the contextual 
aspects should be considered before applying the model for analysis. 
In order to find a model that suits the context of analysis, the 
researcher will briefly present three of the most prominent 
approaches for decision-making process analysis: the policy network 
approach, the advocacy coalition framework, and the rounds model.   
 
3.2.1 Policy Networks 
 
One of the perspectives that scholars in political sciences and public 
administration now discuss is the policy network. The concept of 
policy network has received a lot of attention from researchers in 
various countries, mostly in developed countries such as the United 
Kingdom, the United States, Germany, and the Netherlands. 
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However, the observation of network configurations in the literature 
of public policymaking is not completely new. It can be traced back to 
the late 1960s and early 1970s (see Kenis & Schneider, 1991; Klijn, 
1997; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000). 
Basically, the network perspective on public policy sees policy as 
being formed through interactions between different actors who have 
their own perceptions and strategies (Edelenbos & Klijn, 2006). The 
core of this perspective is a decentralized concept of social 
organization and governance: society is no longer exclusively 
controlled by a central intelligence; rather, controlling devices are 
dispersed, and intelligence is distributed among a multiplicity of 
action (or “processing”) units. The coordination of these units is no 
longer the result of “central steering” or some kind of “prestabilized 
harmony” but emerges through purposeful action by exchanging 
information and other relevant resources (Marin & Mayntz, 1991).  
The network approach assumes that policy is made through 
complex interaction processes among a large number of actors. The 
interaction takes place within networks of interdependent actors. 
These actors are mutually dependent, so policy can only be realized 
on the basis of co-operation. This co-operation, however, is by no 
means simple or spontaneous, and it requires different types of game 
management and network constitution (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000). 
The network approach assumes that actors are mutually dependent. 
Actors cannot achieve their objectives without resources that are 
possessed by other actors (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000). 
In the literature on governance, the concept of policy network 
could be located somewhere beyond or between the market and 
hierarchies (Kenis & Schneider, 1991). In relation to decision-making 
processes, many decisions in the public sector have to be made in 
networks that consist of various actors who are mutually dependent 
and have diverging interests (de-Bruijn, 2005). 
Policy networks have been intensively criticized in the literature 
(Blom-Hansen, 1997; Borzel, 1998; Dowding, 1995; Rhodes, 1996). 
One central point of criticism is that the network approach is not 
based on a solid theoretical body of knowledge (Borzel, 1998). 
Another criticism is that policy networks are not able to deploy any 
explanatory power (see Borzel, 1998; Dowding, 1995). In response to 
such criticism, Klijn and Koppenjan (2000) clarify the theoretical 
concepts and axioms of the policy network approach and argue that 
this framework has important explanatory power for both, strategic 
interaction processes as well as institutional relations. The 
researcher argues that the policy network approach has developed 
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into a relatively elaborate, empirically grounded, and recognizable 
theoretical framework. 
Klijn (1997) offers an excellent overview of the theoretical 
background of the policy network approach. As shown in Figure 3.1, 
the theoretical roots of the policy network can be found in policy 
science, organizational science, and political science.   
In spite of such criticism and limitations, however, policy network 
has some advantage as an approach for analysis. An advantage of the 
network concept is that it helps us to understand not only formal 
institutional arrangements but also highly complex informal 
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3.2.2 Advocacy Coalition Framework 
The advocacy coalition framework (ACF) was developed by Sabatier 
(1988). Its goal was to provide a coherent understanding of the major 
factors and processes affecting the overall policy process, including 
problem definition, policy formulation, implementation, and revision 
in a specific policy domain—over periods of a decade or more. This 
framework emerged out of the following: (a) a search for an 
alternative to the stages heuristic that was then dominating policy 
studies, (b) a desire to synthesize the best features of the 'top-down' 
and 'bottom-up' approaches to policy implementation, and (c) a 
commitment to incorporate technical information in a more 
prominent role in policy process theories (Sabatier, 1998). 
The ACF was developed upon a policy subsystem that is also 
known as a part of network theory. Various terms have been used by 
scholars, such as policy network, policy community, policy subsystem 
or policy domain (Coleman & Perl, 1999). Figure 3.2 presents a 
general overview of the framework from Sabatier (1998). On the left 
side are two sets of exogenous variables—one quite stable and other 
more dynamic—that affect the constraints and opportunities of the 
subsystem actors.  
 
 
Figure 3.2 ACF Diagram 1998 Version (Sabatier, 1998) 
Complex Decision-Making Process 45 
Within the subsystem, the ACF assumes that actors can be 
aggregated into a number of 'advocacy coalitions’ (usually one to 
four), each composed of actors from various government and private 
organizations, who both (a) share a set of normative and causal 
beliefs and (b) engage in a non-trivial degree of coordinated activity 
over time. The ACF explicitly argues that most coalitions will include 
not only interest group leaders but also agency officials, legislators 
from multiple levels of government, applied researchers, and perhaps 
even a few journalists. At any given point, the subsystem will usually 
contain a number of individuals and organizations unassociated with 
any coalition, but the ACF assumes that most will be unimportant 
over the long term because they will either leave or be incorporated 
into one of the coalitions (Sabatier, 1998).  
Elliot and Schlaepfer (2001) used the ACF to analyze the 
development of forest certification systems in Canada, Indonesia, and 
Sweden. For the Indonesian case study, they confirm that the 
Indonesian forest policy subsystem is dominated by a close alliance 
between the forest industry and the Ministry of Forestry, which is 
called a Forestry Coalition. There is a second, much weaker, coalition 
of NGOs and social organizations, which could be called the 
Environmental Coalition. Furthermore, the researcher found changes 
in international public opinion, leading to greater environmental 
concerns in some of Indonesia’s export markets, and the nomination 
of a new Minister of Forestry in 1993, who expressed concerns about 
the environmental impacts of forestry. Meanwhile, within the 
Indonesian forest policy subsystem, active policy learning was 
occurring throughout the 1990s, based on numerous national and 
international research projects and publications.  
 
3.2.3 The Rounds Model 
 
Teisman (2000) has compared and elaborated three models: the 
phase, the streams, and the rounds model in the Netherlands. The 
phase model focuses on successive and distinctive stages in a process, 
i.e. defining a problem, searching for, choosing and implementing 
solutions. The stream model emphasizes concurrent streams of 
participants, problems and solutions, defining decision making as the 
connection between these streams. Teisman then emphasized the 
third approach, the so-called rounds model, which assumed that 
decision making consists of different decision-making rounds.  
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The terms of rounds in decision making have been mentioned 
before by Kunreuther, Lathrop, & Linnerooth (1982). They developed 
an approach labeled the multi-attribute multi-party model (MAMP). 
The MAMP model is a natural extension of the burgeoning literature 
on the key role that limited time, attention, and information 
processing capabilities play in political decision making when there 
are uncertain outcomes and likely conflicts among interested parties. 
The model also highlights the importance of decentralized and 
sequential decision making and indicates the role that formal risk 
assessments have played at each stage of the process. The decision-
making process can be separated into different rounds. A round is 
simply a convenient device to illustrate a change in the focus of 
discussions. This new focus or direction can be triggered by: (1) a key 
decision taken (or stalemate reached due to conflicts among parties) 
or (2) a change in the context of discussions due to an anticipated 
event, the entrance of a new party, or new evidence brought to the 
debate (Kunreuther et al., 1982). 
As Radford (1978) and Monnikhof (2006) noted, the concept of 
rounds in decision making has been mentioned by Braybrooke (1974). 
Many complex decision problems are cyclical in nature. A round 
opens with an initiative or policy intention of one of the parties that 
serves as the “trigger” for the others. Each round ends with a crucial 
decision, a decision that offers a solution for the question that is 
central in the particular policy round. A crucial decision heralds a 
new round where it guides the subsequent policy game (Koppenjan & 
Klijn, 2004).    
Teisman (2000) argues that the added value of the rounds model 
as compared to the phases and streams models can be summed up in 
three points. First, in term of actors, problems, and solutions, the 
rounds model focuses on the interaction between actors, during 
which they can negotiate acceptable combinations of problems and 
solutions. In the rounds model, decision making is not about a single 
issue, or about separated streams of problems, solutions, and 
participants, but about dynamic combinations of sets of problems and 
solutions represented by different actors. Second, in terms of policy 
adoption, yardsticks, or results, a round begins and ends with the 
adoption of a certain combination of a problem definition and a 
(virtual) solution by one or more actors. Third, in terms of policy 
evaluation and evaluation criteria, evaluation in the rounds model no 
longer focuses on the question of whether the policy result agrees 
with a single policy intention, but whether the result responds to the 
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objective of all the parties involved at the moment policy effects can 
be distinguished.  
Figure 3.3 visualizes Teisman’s version of the concept of decision 
making in the rounds model. Teisman (2000) has applied the model 
to the case of the Betuwe line, a railway line intended for the 
transport of cargo between the port of Rotterdam in the Netherlands 
and Germany. 
 




3.2.4. Applying the Rounds Model and Networks Approach for 
Decision-making Process Analysis 
 
In the foregoing section (3.2.1-3), the study has discussed three 
conceptual models or frameworks that are found in the decision-
making process analysis literature. In regard to the large number of 
existing frameworks for decision-making process analysis, it is 
important to avoid creating and adding new ones unnecessarily. The 
most fruitful strategy would be to take the rounds model as the 
starting point since it explains the complexity of the decision-making 
process. The advantage of the rounds model is that it focuses on the 
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interaction between actors, and covers dynamic combinations of sets 
of problems and solutions in the decision-making process. 
Since the study aims to elaborate the complexity of the decision-
making process, the researcher has avoided binding himself too 
dogmatically or rigidly to one model or approach as each model has 
its own assumption. The aim is not to validate a preferred theoretical 
approach; rather, to borrow the model that has relevance in the 
context of the study. In addition to the rounds model, the policy 
network approach could complement the analysis.   
To conduct the analysis, the study adopts the rounds model 
(Teisman, 2000) to identify the rounds of decision making and the 
actors involved. To get an insight into the actors and their 
interaction, an analysis of actor and arena of decision making is 
undertaken following Koppenjan and Klijn (2004). 
 
3.3 Context: Infrastructure Policymaking, Changing 
Environment, and PPPs in Indonesia  
 
This section briefly presents Indonesia’s infrastructure development 
and policy and the changing environment of policymaking as a 
background to understand the actors, rules, and interactions: who 
participates and how they participate in the decision-making 
processes.     
Despite major infrastructural development since the first five-
year planning program was launched in the late 1960s, Indonesia 
still faces major challenges in its infrastructure sectors. In the 
transportation sector, roads in and around major cities are heavily 
congested, while many inter-urban and rural roads are in poor 
condition. The situation is almost the same for other sectors. There is 
a problem of insufficiency and spatial difference in infrastructure 
availability and service. 
Geographic conditions and an uneven distribution of the 
population pose a challenge in infrastructure provision. Developing a 
transportation system that serves the needs of the people and links 
densely populated Java, the rugged and sparsely populated terrain of 
Papua, and the hundreds of small populated islands in the Malukus 
and Nusatenggaras is no mean feat, as the system has to encompass 
inter-island shipping, river transportation, and civil aviation. 
Electricity supply systems outside the Java-Bali grid are highly 
fragmented. The fact that the primary energy resources are located 
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far from the main demand centers also makes infrastructure 
provision more difficult (Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs, 
2006b). To overcome the situation, Indonesia has adopted a regional 
approach in developing infrastructure by dividing the country into 
three regions: the developed region located in the western part of 
Indonesia and the developing and the newly developing regions 
located in the east (see Figure 3.4). The developed region is where the 
economic activities are concentrated with high demand for 
infrastructure and high commercial viability. The other two less 
developed regions, although they have similar needs for 
infrastructure, have low commercial viability (Coordinating Ministry 
for Economic Affairs, 2005). 
 
 
Figure 3.4 The Three Economic Regions in Indonesia 
 
3.3.1 Changing Environment 
 
During the Soeharto government regime (the New Order regime) 
beginning in 1966, the key components of the centralized system of 
public administration were put into place. The new system required 
all local government officials to be tied to a line ministry of the 
central government for budget and responsibility, and to the 
employees of the Ministry of Home Affairs for their salary. The 
national government appointed the district head (bupati), city 
mayors (walikota), and governors of the provinces. In addition, 
central government ministries operated offices at the local level, and 
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revenues for these offices (dinas) came directly from the central 
government (Silver, 2003). 
There have been marked changes in the public management of 
infrastructure, particularly after the financial crisis in 1998. The 
environment in which policymaking takes place has changed. 
Basically, the policy and framework for infrastructure development 
were embedded in a five-year development plan, or Repelita [now 
Indonesia’s medium-term development plan, or Rencana 
Pembangunan Jangka Menengah (RPJM)], which outlined the main 
policy priorities and direction of the government. Nowadays, the 
RPJM encapsulates the new president's vision of the future for the 
country and the strategy for its realization. This strategy marks yet 
another departure in the formulation of development policy. It 
underscores policy and institutional reform, and the role and 
involvement of civil society in development. It is more balanced in 
that the social and political agendas are just as important as the 
economic agenda. 
The decentralization program that was launched initially in 1999 
has transferred many responsibilities relating to infrastructure 
provision to sub-national entities. The role of central government 
agencies in infrastructure policymaking changed. There is now 
greater distribution of resources in decision making. In the past, 
Bappenas (the Ministry of National Development Planning) played 
an important role, which some people called a “super ministry.” 
Bappenas prepared the Repelita. Along with the Coordinating 
Ministry for the Economy and Industry, it also coordinated 
Indonesia’s policy development and had budgetary powers. 
Currently, its powers have been circumscribed, mainly because the 
ministry is no longer involved in budget decision making, focusing 
only on planning. 
The role of budget allocation was then shared between the 
Ministry of Finance and the House of Representatives. This gave the 
latter a stronger role in decision making than in the past. As part of 
the institutional reformation, several new ministry-level committees 
were established. For infrastructure-related institutions, new 
committees such as the Committee on Policy for the Acceleration of 
Infrastructure Development (KKPPI), Toll Road Authority Agency 
(BPJT), Telecommunication Regulatory Agency (Badan Regulasi 
Telekomunikasi Indonesia—BRTI) and other sector specific or cross-
sector committees were set up. 
As a result, public management in terms of planning, 
coordination and implementation in infrastructure became 
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complicated. Responsibilities were divided both horizontally and 
vertically, making integration of planning and coordination of 
implementation a formidable challenge (World Bank, 2004).  
Bappenas serves as the planning advisor for the committees, and 
the Coordinating Ministry of Economic Affairs focuses more on the 
short-term implementation matters. 
New institutions, new actors and changing roles for the actors 
resulted in the decision making powers becoming more distributed. 
Other dimensions in Indonesia’s environment of policymaking were 
corruption and governance (a sector department commonly combined 
the role of policymaker, regulator, and shareholder representative.)  
Much effort has been made since the collapse of Soeharto’s 
government to tackle corruption and create better governance. 
However, with the new environments and uncertainties involved, 
private businesses find that investment in infrastructure is more 
risky. 
 
3.3.2 Public–Private Partnership 
 
The lack of financing sources from the government budget has led 
policymakers to believe that PPP is one of the most promising 
answers for infrastructure investment. Infrastructure projects have 
been traditionally financed by government budgets and foreign loans, 
and operated by public entities. Driven by fiscal austerity and 
widespread disenchantment with the performance of SOEs, the 
government is now turning to the private sector to build, operate, 
finance, own, and transfer infrastructure facilities in many sectors.  
Indonesia is now in transition, moving from the state to private 
provision of infrastructure. However, private involvement in 
Indonesia is hampered to a varying degree by factors such as an 
inadequate legal and regulatory framework, poorly structured 
concession and contractual arrangements, high transaction costs, and 
a lack of an established reputation and track record where PPPs are 
concerned (Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs, 2006a). 
Much effort has been made, however, to restructure the 
government’s role in many infrastructure sectors. In term of 
operations, the public sector’s role is being transformed from that of a 
service provider to one of an overseer of service contracts. In policy-
making, the government separates responsibility of strategic 
planning, from regulation, and operation. The demarcation of roles 
and the creation of independent regulatory agencies are particularly 
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important when there is competition between private and publicly 
owned service providers, and when there is a need to insulate tariffs 
from political pressure. One such example can be found in the road 
sector. Jasa Marga (the SOE for toll roads) is no longer the regulator 
as well as the road service provider. A new toll road regulator agency 
(BPJT) has been established.  
This study assumes increased complexity in decision making. The 
changing environment has brought with it uncertainties. Raising 
networks and new players in policymaking can contribute to 
complexity. Even unitary decision makers face complexity, as Keeney 
and Raiffa (1976) noted; simple value problems would be 
conceptually easy to solve if there were no uncertainties. In complex 
value problems, consequences at the ends of the decision tree cannot 
be adequately described objectively by a single attribute. 
 
3.4 Research Method 
 
The previous section presented frameworks or models for the 
analysis. As Borzel (1998) has elaborated, in terms of the network 
approach, there are two methods (quantitative and qualitative) that 
researchers usually choose. Both methods consider networks as an 
analytical tool. The distinction is that the quantitative method 
approaches network analysis as social structure analysis. The 
relationships between actors are analyzed in terms of their cohesion, 
structural equivalence, and spatial representation using quantitative 
methods such as ascendant hierarchical classification, density tables, 
block models, etc. The qualitative approach, on the other hand, is 
more process-oriented. It focuses less on the mere structure of 
interaction between actors and more on the content of these 
interactions using qualitative methods. In this sense, the study 
prefers to use qualitative methods in order to respond to the research 
objective and questions.  
The objective of this study is to understand the complexity of the 
decision-making process in infrastructure investment in Indonesia, 
particularly in PPP arrangements. The research question is how 
decision making in infrastructure investment, particularly in the 
PPP scheme, has been conducted in Indonesia. The sub-questions 
are: to what extent do complexities of decision making actually exist? 
How does the government, as a key actor deal with the new 
environment? 
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Like many other research studies that have been conducted in 
this area, this one, too, works with case studies. Case study as a 
research strategy has been extensively applied for the topic of 
decision making. It is also useful for covering contextual conditions. 
Yin (1994) has defined a case study as an empirical enquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, 
especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and the 
context are not clearly evident.  
Four case studies on infrastructure investment based on the PPP 
scheme were selected (for a full description see section 3.5). These 
projects were selected because decision making in a PPP is extremely 
complex—there is not only institutional complexity but also strategic 
complexity (Klijn & Teisman, 2003).  
The theory, framework, or model described had to be supported 
by evidence or facts. Gathering evidence for policy analysis can be 
usefully divided into two broad categories: document research and 
field research. Field research includes conducting interviews and 
gathering original data. Document research includes reviewing 
relevant literature dealing with theory and evidence and locating 
existing sources of raw (primary) data (Weimer & Vining, 2004).  
The researcher’s strategy in collecting data and evidence was 
twofold. First, collection of data on events: lists of actions and 
policies, i.e., what is recorded in newspaper archives. The researcher 
collected archival records of news related to the four projects from 
major national newspapers and magazines, (many are from 
KOMPAS, the daily newspaper). Then the data and results were 
verified by interviewing actors from the private sector and the 
government staff involved with or likely to know about the project. 
Interview guides (see Appendix 3.2) were used to interview 22 actors 
(for names and designations, see Appendix 3.3). These were among 
the most influential people in the network, with prominent positions 
in the major organizations or institutions in the network. In addition, 
the researcher gathered a number of policy documents from 
government offices and from preeminent actors such as private 
companies involved in the project.  
The study concentrates on case studies related to the transport 
sector since transport infrastructure is closely related to economic 
geography and spatial development (see chapter 5). Another reason is 
that a transportation project such as a toll road is most suitable for a 
PPP case analysis in Indonesia. The study also considers case studies 
during different project time spans in order to capture policy 
evolution. Hence, four case studies covering different time periods 
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have been selected. The first one is the Cawang–Tanjung Priok toll 
road project for building an inner ring road in Jakarta. The project 
was completed in the 1990s and could be categorized as a success 
story. It is assumed that private-sector participation in this project 
was quite high. The second case study is the Cipularang toll road, a 
new toll road built in 2005 connecting two cities (Jakarta and 
Bandung) in two provinces (Jakarta and West Java). The third case 
study is the Jakarta Outer Ring Road (JORR) Project, which was 
completed recently. The fourth case study is a triple-decker project, a 
combination of arterial road, toll road, and light rail transportation 
located in Jakarta. This project, however, failed and was finally 
abandoned. So the study covers more and less recent cases among the 
research projects, and more and less successful ones. For each of the 
case studies, the analysis will start by identifying the “rounds” of 
decision making and the actors involved, and subsequently analyze 
the “arenas” of interaction between the actors. 
 
3.5 Case Studies: Four PPP Toll Road Projects  
 
This section presents a description of each of the infrastructure 
projects selected as a case study. To recapitulate, the researcher 
selected PPP project cases because PPPs are well suited as examples 
of decision making, cooperation, and coordination in a complex 
situation (Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007; Klijn & Teisman, 2003). The 
study deliberately selected PPP projects (toll roads) in the transport 
sector, which is one of the sectors in infrastructure development that 
is widely discussed for its impact on the spatial economy. (Appendix 
3.1 shows location of case studies in Jakarta and West Java.)   
Toll road development in Indonesia began in 1978 with the 
operation of the Jagorawi (Jakarta–Bogor–Ciawi) toll road. At the 
time, PT Jasa Marga was the only toll road operator in Indonesia. 
The government embarked for private sector participation in 1987 
with the Build Operate Transfer (BOT) scheme. However, until 2006 
only about 606 km of toll roads were in operation, of which 464 km 
was being managed by PT Jasa Marga, and the remaining 142 km by 
a private enterprise. This achievement is quite low when considered 
in the context of Indonesia’s geographic spread and the achievement 
of  countries such as China and Malaysia.  
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In response to the low progress of toll road development, the 
government has focused on improving the PPP legal and institutional 
framework. This section sheds light on the decision-making process 
of infrastructure projects within the PPP scheme. 
The first study on a toll-way system for Indonesia was done in 
1974, right after the completion of the Jakarta Metropolitan Area 
Transportation Study (JMATS) conducted by a German consultant 
(Arge Becker-Intertraffic) under the framework of the Technical 
Cooperation Agreement between the Government of Indonesia and 
Federal Republic of Germany. The Directorate General of Highways 
(the Bina Marga) then commissioned the same consultant to 
investigate the technical, economic, and financial feasibility of the 
Jakarta-West Java Tollway system. The work started in November 
1974 and was finished in October 1976. The Jakarta-West Java 
Tollway system comprised the Jakarta Intra Urban System of 
tollways, the Jakarta Ring Road, and three regional highways in the 
major transportation and development corridors leading east, west, 
and south from the capital city (Ministry of Public Works, 1978). 
Based on the study, the government then decided to construct 
three regional highways surrounding Jakarta: the Jakarta-Bogor-
Ciawi highway, the Jakarta–Tangerang highway, and the Jakarta–
Cikampek highway. Construction of the first two was financed by the 
Overseas Cooperation Fund, Japan (OECF), and the third highway 
was financed by the World Bank.  
The first case study is the Cawang–Tanjung Priok toll road 
project, which was then extended to the Cawang–Tanjung Priok–
Pluit toll road. This is the first renowned PPP project for toll road 
development in Indonesia. The road was built and operated by a 
private company, PT Citra Marga Nusaphala Persada (CMNP). The 
company was owned and directed by Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana, a 
daughter of former president Soeharto. (She is no longer a 
shareholder of the company now.) The company got the contract from 
the government in 1987, and construction began in 1988. 
The second case study examines the Cikampek–Purwakarta–
Padalarang (Cipularang) toll road. The road has been designed to 
anticipate potential high traffic from Jakarta to Bandung and vice 
versa. It will connect two existing toll roads in Jakarta (the Jakarta–
Cikampek toll road) and a toll road in Bandung (the Padalarang–
Cileunyi toll road).  
The third case study evaluates the JORR. Sixty-seven km long, 
the JORR was conceived in 1976 as part of the West Java Tollway 
System and was envisaged to play an important role in 
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complementing the three regional highway systems (Jagorawi, 
Jakarta-Cikampek, and Jakarta–Tangerang), to ease traffic 
congestion in the center of the capital, and to create a better links to 
the Tanjung Priok Harbour and the Soekarno Hatta Airport. 
The fourth case study describes the Triple-Decker Project 
situated in Jakarta. It is a three-level transportation system 
consisting of an arterial road on the ground level, an elevated light 
rail transit track on the second level, and a toll road on the top level 
linking Cinere, South Jakarta, with downtown Kota, West Jakarta. 
The project was proposed and initiated by a private company, PT 
Citra Lamtorogung Persada, in cooperation with PT Steady Safe. 
One of the companies (PT Citra Lamtorogung Persada) is owned by 
Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana, better known as Mbak Tutut, the eldest 
daughter of President Soeharto. 
 
3.6 Analysis and Discussion 
 
The empirical events and the course of action taken by the actors in 
the four cases lead to an analysis of the decision-making processes, 
from which a number of conclusions can be drawn.  
3.6.1 Analysis of the First Case   
 
With closer attention to the streams of decisions taken by several 
actors, a number of different rounds can be distinguished. Table 3.1 
summarizes the rounds of decision making in case number one. 
The Cawang–Tanjung Priok toll road is part of Jakarta’s intra-
urban tollway. Initially, the road was built mainly to anticipate 
incoming traffic flow as a result of the completion of the regional 
highway between Jakarta and Cikampek. The government and donor 
agency realized that after the completion of the Jakarta–Cikampek 
freeway, the traffic volume for the metropolitan area of Jakarta was 
potentially high and could cause serious distribution problems inside 
Jakarta. The World Bank, which financed the Jakarta-Cikampek 
freeway, requested that the Directorate General of Highways should 
solve this problem.  
The request by the World Bank was the starting point of the first 
round in the decision-making. The round ran smoothly, and there 
was no significant disagreement. It was completed when the 
government of Indonesia, using OECF funds, requested the Japanese 
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consultant (Pacific Consultants International) to conduct a review of 
the feasibility study of the Jakarta Intra Urban Tollway, including 
the preliminary design and detailed engineering services. The 
Jakarta Intra urban Tollway network then consisted of three links 
and additional one link of the Jakarta Harbour road that would 
connect the three regional highways. The feasibility study of the 
Cawang–Tanjung Priok toll road was completed in 1983.  
Aiming to find alternative ways of financing infrastructure, the 
government decided to invite private partnership. The tender 
offering of the Cawang–Tanjung Priok toll road triggered the second 
round of the decision-making process, mainly to explore private 
participation. The round ended with the government declaring the 
CMNP consortium as the contractors. Following the decision, in 1987 
a new feasibility study was conducted with a new, elevated toll road 
idea.  
The third round started when a decision had to be made after the 
new toll road project Tanjung Priok–Pluit/ Jembatan Tiga was 
completed. The toll road was also operated by CMNP. Both projects 
are part of the intra urban tollway system. The other part of the 
project in the Intra Urban Tollway system (Cawang–Tomang–Pluit 
toll road) was executed by the state-owned company toll road 
operator PT Jasa Marga. A new proposal to increase the concession 
period of CMNP and revenue-sharing of the toll road collection 
between the CMNP and Jasa Marga was then submitted.  
 
Table 3.1 Rounds of Decision Making (first case study) 
Main empirical events Interpretations based on 
the rounds model 
A request by the World Bank to 
the government to anticipate 
transport problems in Jakarta. A 
feasibility study of the Jakarta 
Intra Urban Tollway then 
conducted, including the 
preliminary design and detailed 
engineering services (1983) 
The first round:  
exploring an action to 
anticipate future problems and 
the need for transport 
infrastructure   
Government offers partnership to 
private company. Finally, the 
CMNP consortium wins the 
contract (1986/1987).  
The second round: 
making goals to develop and to 
apply the idea of a private 
provision in infrastructure  
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Main empirical events Interpretations based on 
the rounds model 
New construction of harbor toll 
road Tanjung Priok–Jembatan 
Tiga by PT CMNP as an extension 
of Cawang–Tanjung–Priuk toll 
road to Jembatan Tiga (1993)  
The third round: 
new agreement on concession 
and revenue-sharing is 
proposed after the new toll 
road is constructed    
Government announces it will 
evaluate and renegotiate toll road 
management and concession for 
Cawang-Priok-Pluit (2000). 
Finally, a new revenue-sharing 
agreement was reached (2002). 
The fourth round: 
economic crisis followed by 
political reform creates huge 
pressure on the government to 
evaluate toll road management 
for projects touched by 
corruption 
Adapted from Teisman (2000) 
 
The third round was wrapped up when the government decided to 
combine the toll road projects into one package and distribute the 
combined revenues from toll collection in the network to PT Jasa 
Marga and PT CMNP. However, the allocation was unfair as PT 
CMNP received 75 percent while PT Jasa Marga received only 25 
percent.  
Provoked by anti-corruption and anti-Soeharto issues, in 2000, a 
fourth round emerged. The government announced that it was 
evaluating and renegotiating toll road management and concessions 
for the Cawang–Tanjung Priok–Pluit toll road, which was followed by 
the establishment of a team to renegotiate an unfair MOU on 
revenue sharing between PT Jasa Marga and PT CMNP. Finally, in 
2002, a new deal on revenue sharing was announced: 55 percent for 
CMNP and 45 percent for Jasa Marga.  
Table 3.2 depicts the group of actors that can be distinguished 
during each round of the decision-making process. In the first round, 
the study identified the World Bank, the Directorate General of 
Highways, and the government of Japan. In this round, all the actors 
shared the same perception about the problem even though they 
participated in different ways, since the resources they brought to 
the table were different. 
In the second round, three actors were identified: the Directorate 
General of Highways, a private company, and a state-owned 
company, Jasa Marga. In this round, the government conducted a 
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PPP investment procedure. Participation was regulated by central 
government regulation. With common interests and a superior 
informal resource held by a private company (CMNP), the round 
went smoothly and finally CMNP was elected as the operator of the 
toll road. In the third round, CMNP dominated the decision-making 
process due to the informal power the consortium held. However, 
during the fourth round, the decision made in the third round had to 
be revised. 
 
Table 3.2 Actor Analysis (first case study) 
Round Main actors Participation 
1 The World Bank  Requested the government to solve 
a potential problem of congestion in 
regard to the opening of new inter-




Made the transport infrastructure 
planning and policy 
 Government of 
Japan (OECF) 




Sought private involvement in 
transport infrastructure 
development  
 Private company 
(CMNP) 
Participated in the process of 
private operator selection for the toll 
road 
 Jasa Marga As a toll road regulator at that time, 
Jasa Marga managed the agreement 
with CMNP  
3 CMNP Built and operated the new toll road 
connected to the previous toll road  
 Jasa Marga Cooperated with CMNP ideas of 
new toll road revenue-sharing 
 Ministry of 
Finance & 
Ministry of Public 
Works 





Issued the legal framework for 
review of the toll road agreement 
link to suspected corruption  
 Jasa Marga Negotiated revenue-sharing 
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Round Main actors Participation 
agreement 
 CMNP Negotiated revenue-sharing 
agreement 
 Ministry of 
Finance and 
Ministry of Public 
Works 
Withdrew the previous legal 
framework for the revenue-sharing 
agreement 
Adapted from Koppenjan and Klijn (2004) 
 
Policy games are complex not only because there are many players 
making unpredictable strategic choices, but also because they are 
often simultaneously involved in more than one arena (Van-Gils & 
Klijn, 2007). The researcher identified four arenas in the first case: 
the planning arena, the PPP arena, the toll road management arena, 
and the political arena. Summaries of arena analysis are presented 
in Table 3.3 The fourth round, which deals with the review and 
renegotiation of revenue-sharing, takes place in two arenas: the toll 
road management arena and the political arena. The decision of the 
revenue-sharing review was made within the context of political 
reform, which then affected the decision made in the toll road 
management arena.  
There were different interactions among the actors in each arena. 
The Directorate General of Highways had frequent interactions with 
almost all arenas, while the donor agencies had less frequent 
interactions compared to other actors. With this kind of contact 
pattern, the Directorate General of Highways became the central 
actor in the network.   
 
Table 3.3 Arena Analysis (first case study) 







Preparing a policy to 
ease the projected 
problem in the 
transport system 
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3 SOEs in toll road 
operation; a 
private company; 




concession for toll 
road operation 
 4 SOEs in toll road 
















revising the former 
agreement 
Adapted from Koppenjan and Klijn (2004) 
   
3.6.2 Analysis of the Second Case Study   
The same process that was followed for the first case study was 
adopted, beginning with identifying the rounds of decision making. 
Four rounds of decision making were identified, as summarized in 
Table 3.4. The first round started when the government decided to 
conduct a study on the Jakarta West Java tollway system. The study 
was completed in 1976. The government then decided to conduct a 
further feasibility study of the Jakarta–Cikampek toll road in 1984. 
The second round dealt with an initiative for private partnership. 
Initially, in 1986, the project was offered internationally and tried to 
attract foreign investors. In the end, in 1994, PT Citra Ganesha 
Marga Nusantara emerged the winner in the bidding process and 
held the right of concession, to build and operate the Cikampek-
Padalarang toll road network. The consortium members consisted of 
Trafalgar House from England with 40 percent of the shares, and PT 
Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada and PT Jasa Marga each had 30 
percent. Land clearance was done by the government from 1990 to 
1992.   
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However, the consortium did not make any significant progress in 
construction due to financial problems because of the Indonesian 
financial crisis in late 1997. The third round mainly dealt with the 
impact of the crisis. The government issued a presidential decree 
(number 39/97) in 1997 and decided to postpone major infrastructure 
projects (one of them the Cipularang toll road project). Later, in 2001, 
the Ministry of Settlements and Regional Infrastructure (now the 
Ministry of Public Works) withdrew the toll road concession from PT 
Citra Ganesha Marga Nusantara. Following that, PT Jasa Marga 
requested the right of concession of the Cipularang toll road project 
from the government. The government then agreed to give the 
Cipularang toll road concession to Jasa Marga. 
 
Table 3.4 Rounds of Decision Making (second case study) 
Main empirical events Interpretations based on the 
rounds model 
Study of the Jakarta-West Java 
Tollway system (finished in 
1976). Project feasibility study 
(1984). 
The first round 
explored a trans-regional 
highway transportation system  
The toll road project was offered 
to foreign investors (1986). The 
consortium Citra Ganesha 
Marga Nusantara wins the 
contract (1994).  
The second round 
explored private provision 
The government announced its 
decision to delay the project 
because of the economic crisis 
(1997). The government then 
canceled the concession from 
CGMN (2001) and decided that 
Jasa Marga (toll road SOEs) 
should take over the project 
(2002). 
The third round 
dealt with the financial crisis 
President Megawati requested 
that Jasa Marga continue 
construction of stage II of the 
Cipularang toll road (2004). 
The fourth round— 
Stage II of the Cipularang toll 
road 
Adapted from Teisman (2000) 
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Construction of the first stage of the Cipularang toll road began in 
2002. The first stage involved construction of 18 km of road, which 
was then officially opened for public use by President Megawati in 
2004. During the ceremony, President Megawati requested that PT 
Jasa Marga construct the second stage of the Cipularang toll road, 
which was to be finished before April 2005, mainly because there was 
an Asia–Africa conference in Bandung in 2005. According to Jasa 
Marga’s previous plans, the second stage of the Cipularang toll road 
was scheduled for completion in 2006, not in 2005. Construction of 
the second stage of Cipularang (length 41 km) was technically more 
difficult due to the geographical terrain, which was hilly and 
required high bridges to be constructed. On April 24, 2005, 
participants in the Asia–Africa Conference finally used the road to 
travel from Jakarta to Bandung. The official opening ceremony was 
launched by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in early June 
2005, and the road opened to the public on April 26, 2005. 
In the second case study, the actors are distinguishable in only 
three main groups: the central government, the private sector, and 
SOE for toll roads (Table 3.5). It was only to be expected that, in such 
a scenario, the central government would take the lead in decision 
making due to the social and political characteristics where the 
hierarchy in the public administration system was applied.  
 
Table 3.5 Actor Analysis (second case study) 
Round Main actors Participation 
1 Directorate General 
of Highways 
Transport infrastructure planning 
and policy 
2 Directorate General 
of Highways 
Sought private involvement in 
transport infrastructure 
development  
 Private investor Private operator of toll road 
 Jasa Marga As a toll road regulator at that 
time, Jasa Marga managed the 
agreement with private operator 
3 Central 
Government 
Decision to delay the project and 
revise the right to concession  
 Jasa Marga Interested in project development  
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Round Main actors Participation 
 Private operator 
(CGMN) 
Loss of concession 
4 Central 
government 
Full support during the second 
stage of development 
 Jasa Marga Sped up the project completion 
Adapted from Koppenjan and Klijn (2004) 
 
There were more actors involved in decision making during the 
second round. This was mainly due to government support for private 
participation in infrastructure investment. The pattern of 
participation and the perception of actors during the second round 
was similar to what was observed during the second round in the 
first case study. 
The decisions about the Cikampek–Padalarang toll road project 
were made in more than one arena. The financial crisis also created a 
new context policy that affected the decision-making process in the 
PPP arena. Table 3.6 presents an arena analysis with the key actors’ 
involvement and their activities in the arena. 
Readers can observe that in the interaction among the three 
actors in the second case study there exists almost the same high 
frequency of interaction. However, we should also note the 
institutional context, such as the formal structure of relationship 
between the Directorate General of Highways and Jasa Marga as an 
SOE. In this case, a formal rule should play an important role in the 
interaction process among actors. In reality, an informal rule is 
formed during the mutual interaction (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). 
  
Table 3.6 Arena Analysis (second case study) 






Creating a master plan 
of transportation 











Adapted from Koppenjan and Klijn (2004) 
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3.6.3 Analysis of the Third Case Study 
 
The first round of the decision-making process on the JORR project 
revolved around conducting a study on the Jakarta West Java 
tollway system. The study was completed in 1976. The second round 
related to the PPP initiative and ended with the decision that the 
JORR would be divided into seven sections (S, E1, E2, E3, N, W1, 
W2), and that the project concessions would be awarded to PT Citra 
Mataram Satnamarga Persada, PT Citra Bhakti Margatama 
Persada, and PT Marga Nurindo Bhakti under a BOT scheme with 
the state-owned toll operator PT Jasa Marga. Some of the private 
companies are partly owned by former president Soeharto's daughter 
Siti Hardijanti Rukmana. 
Like the second case study (the Cipularang project), the third 
round of JORR decision making was related to the problem of the 
economic crisis in late 1997. Construction commenced in 1993, but 
had to be abandoned when the crisis occurred. The Asset 
Management Unit of the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency 
(IBRA) then took over the companies’ bad debts as the three 
companies could not repay their loans to the banks. In return, the 
companies surrendered the toll road project to the agency. IBRA and 
Jasa Marga then established a new company under the name PT 
Jalantol Lingkar Luar Jakarta (JLJ) to take care of the toll road 
project and take responsibility for settling its debts to IBRA. One of 
the main duties of JLJ was to find a strategic partner or new investor 
for the JORR project.  
In 2001, IBRA announced that a consortium company, DRB-
HICOM from Malaysia, had been selected as the preferred bidder for 
JORR. However, in the same year, Parliament requested that the 
JORR project be retendered. The government agreed to retender 
JORR using the right-to-match scheme, where DRB-HICOM 
Malaysia was the preferred bidder. If other investors proposed a 
lower price, DRB-HICOM had the right to make the same bid. If 
DRB-HICOM was uninterested, then the winner who proposed the 
lowest price would be the investor. When the project retender process 
was finalized, there were four applicants: Torno Internationale Spa, 
Gamula Berhad, the Jakarta Infrastructure consortium, and the 
Malaysian consortium. However, all of them, including the preferred 
bidder, were rejected due to their inability to fulfill requirements. 
Later on, in 2002, legal opinion from the Attorney General, which 
was sought on a request from BPPN, said that the Malaysian 
consortium did not have a right anymore over the JORR project. 
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Table 3.7 Rounds of Decision Making (third case study) 
Main empirical events Interpretations based on the 
rounds model 
Study of the Jakarta-West Java 
Tollway system (finished in 
1976). 
The first round covered 
planning transport infrastructure 
system and development 
JORR was divided into seven 
sections and project concessions 
awarded to CMSP, CBMP, and 
MSB (1990s). 
 
The second round dealt with 
public–private partnership 
Presidential decree to postpone 
projects due to economic crisis 
(1997). Finally, JORR 
concession projects were 
awarded to the state-owned toll 
road operator Jasa Marga 
(2002) 
The third round dealt with the 
financial crisis 
 
Landowners rejected the 
compensation on offer of land 
acquisition (2004). 
 
The fourth round tackled 
land acquisition 
Adapted from Koppenjan and Klijn (2004) 
 
The government, through the Committee on Financial Sector Policy 
(KKSK), finally decided that the JORR project should be transferred 
to the state-owned PT Jasa Marga. In addition, KKSK also gave Jasa 
Marga a discount, whereby the company could pay BPPN 50 percent 
of the total amount within six months, and could pay the rest by 
issuing an obligation. Jasa Marga then resumed construction under 
the JORR project. The third round ended when finally the 
government awarded Jasa Marga the JORR toll road project.  
The fourth round was initiated to tackle the problem of land 
acquisition and clearing. A decision made by some landowners who 
rejected the compensation offered by Jasa Marga triggered a long 
battle during this round. It made little sense to go ahead and 
complete the construction of the toll road because of the blockade 
created by the landowners. Table 3.7 summarizes the rounds of 
decision-making process in the third case study.  
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To analyze the actors’ participation and perceptions in the third 
case study, let us concentrate on the third and fourth rounds. In the 
first and second rounds, the actors, participation, and perception 
were almost identical to those of the previous cases. In the third 
round, actors who were not directly related to toll road investment 
were involved in the decision-making process. Actors such as the 
BPPN made a central decision by redistributing Indonesia’s rights of 
toll road operator. A summary of the actor analysis is presented in 
Table 3.8, while arena analysis is presented in Table 3.9. 
 
Table 3.8 Actor Analysis (third case study) 
Round Main actors Participation 
1 Directorate General of 
Highways 
Transport infrastructure 
planning and policy 
2 Directorate General of 
Highways 
Seeking private involvement in 
transport infrastructure 
development  
 Private investor Private operator of toll road 
3 Jasa Marga As a toll road regulator at that 
time, Jasa Marga managed the 
agreement with the private 
operator 
 Central Government Decision to postpone the 
project and revise the 
concession right 
 Jasa Marga Interested in project 
development  
 Indonesia Bank 
Restructuring Agency 
Redistributing the project to a 
new investor 
 Private toll road 
operator. 
Interested in project 
development 
4 Central Government Drafting legal framework of 
land acquisition such as 
presidential decree. 
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Round Main actors Participation 
 Jasa Marga Persuading landowner and 
approaching the central 
government to create a legal 
framework for land acquisition 
for development   
 Landowner Demanding higher payment for 
land acquisition 
Adapted from Koppenjan and Klijn (2004)  
 
Table 3.9. Arena Analysis (third case study) 






Creating a master 
plan of 
transportation 
network and policy 




















(such as toll road) 
and transferring a 
concession right 
and obligation  
Political 
Arena 




treatment of the 
toll road 
investment for toll 
road companies 
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3.6.4 Analysis of the Fourth Case  
 
The rounds of decision making started with a proposal by a private 
company, CMNP, to build a triple-decker project—a three-level 
transportation system. The project’s aim was to resolve the chronic 
problem of transportation in Jakarta and, in particular, to ease the 
traffic congestion. The government also planned to construct a 
subway between Kota and Blok M, also in South Jakarta. Informally, 
President Soeharto agreed to the proposal of the elevated road 
linking Blok M and Kota in 1991, and the project feasibility study 
was completed in 1993.  
Unlike the subway system, a three-level transportation triple-
decker project for the Jakarta transportation network was not 
included in the spatial plan or the city’s master plan for 1985–2005. 
This issue generated a second round of decision making related to 
spatial planning and environment. In August 1997, the project was 
then finally included in the revised 1997–2010 spatial plan, which 
replaced the 1985–2005 spatial plan.  
Both projects seemed to have an equal chance of being adopted. 
According to the initial plan, the construction of the subway would 
begin in 1997, while the groundbreaking of the triple-decker project 
was also scheduled for mid-1997. The Mass Rapid Transit Subway 
system was to be built by a consortium of Indonesian, Japanese, and 
German companies called the Indonesian Japan European Group, 
and President Soeharto’s son, Bambang Trihatmodjo, was part of it. 
Realizing that the construction of a mass rapid railway network 
in Indonesia by private companies would be difficult at that time due 
to a series of constraints (all of the country’s railway systems are 
under the control of the state-owned railway company Perumka, now 
PT KAI), PT Citra Lamtorogung Persada tried to cooperate with 
Perumka to operate the light rapid transit system. PT Jasa Marga 
was also to be part of the project for the toll road operation. 
A legal issue came up before construction, viz. whether a 
presidential decree (Keppres) was required to carry out the 
construction. The company, however, secured permits or decision 
letters from the Ministry of Public Works and the Ministry of 
Transportation. But this did not satisfy the city government of 
Jakarta, who asked for a presidential decree as a legal basis to give a 
clear picture as to what role it should play.  
Despite the heavy burden due to the financial crisis in late 1997, 
the company was still looking for a possibility to continue the project. 
A new governor, Sutiyoso, also supported continuation of the project.  
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A new issue that came up in 1998 was an environmental impact 
analysis (Analisis Mengenai Dampak Lingkungan—AMDAL). Since 
the construction activity had already been given the go ahead, the 
environmental impact analysis demand came quite late. Yet another 
issue was public involvement in the project. Furthermore, the 
developer was asked to place project implementation details in the 
public domain.  
Finally, in early 1999, the government decided to cancel the 
triple-decker project permit. Thus the fourth round dealing with the 
Asian financial crisis ended with the cancellation of permits for 
construction and investment, the orders for which was released by 
the Ministry of Public Works and the Ministry of Transportation. 
Table 3.10 presents the rounds of decision making for the fourth case 
study. 
 
Table 3.10 Rounds of Decision Making (fourth case study) 
Main empirical events Interpretations based on the 
rounds model 
A proposal was submitted to the 
government by a private party 
for a triple-decker project. 
(1991). Feasibility study (1993) 
The first round: 
proposal for triple-decker project 
Project included in 1997–2010 
revised Jakarta Metropolitan 
spatial plan (1997). Pressure on 
providing an environmental 
impact analysis prior 
construction (1998).  
The second round: 
spatial planning and 
environment 
The government decides to 
cancel the project permit letter 
(1999). 
The third round: 
impact of the financial crisis 
Adapted from Koppenjan and Klijn (2004) 
 
The regional government of Jakarta played an important role in the 
decision making. The proposed infrastructure had to be in line with 
the spatial plan for Jakarta. Therefore, in the second round (see 
Table 3.11), the decision by the regional government to revise the 
spatial plan was central to the project. 
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Table 3.11 Actor Analysis (fourth case study) 
Round Main actors Participation 
1 Private Company Proposing an unsolicited 
transport infrastructure 
project for the Jakarta area  
 Central government 
(Ministry of 
Transportation and 
Ministry of Public Works) 
Issuing construction permit 
 Perumka (stated-owned 
train operator)  
Agreeing to operate the train 
in the triple-decker system 
2 Regional government  Revising the spatial plan 
 Private company  Convincing the regional 
government and 
environmentalists 
3 Private company Recalculating the company’s 
financial burden and 
exposure from the crisis 
 Central government 
(Ministry of 
Transportation and 
Ministry of Public Works) 
Canceling the consortium’s 
construction permit 
Adapted from Koppenjan and Klijn (2004)  
 
 
The decision making involved in the proposed project was mainly 
located in two arenas: the planning arena and the regional policy 
arena. Table 3.12 presents the arena analysis. In this case, the local 
government participated significantly in the planning arena. The 
local government also became a key actor in the regional policy 
arena. Issues such as environmental impact assessment and spatial 
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Table 3.12 Arena Analysis (fourth case study) 
Arena Round Key actors Activities 
Planning 
Arena 









2 Local government, 
the Ministry and 
Department, 
environment 




Adapted from Koppenjan and Klijn (2004) 
 
3.6.5 Comparison of the Four Cases Studies 
 
During the initial phase of the development of highways, the main 
actors in policymaking were the central government (the Directorate 
General of Highways) and the donor agency. Subsequently, as seen in 
the first case study, a private company came into the arena, and the 
donor agency exited the arena. The new policy of private involvement 
in infrastructure automatically added a new actor to the 
policymaking arena.  
In addition, economic, social, and political environmental changes 
brought in new actors. The emergence of politicians in parliament as 
new actors can be seen clearly from the third case study; they played 
significant roles in the decision-making process. Furthermore, 
according to Blom-Hansen (1997), reform in municipal areas could 
also create new actors in the national arena.  
The lack of public consultation, as can be seen from the fourth 
case study, shows that including actors who are concerned with the 
issues is essentially important in opening up the policy networks to 
an extensive set of actors who cannot be considered experts, but who 
are stakeholders all the same (Montpetit, 2003).    
With the increasing number of actors, powers also become more 
distributed, and there was every likelihood that the central 
government’s dominant role would be eroded. We can see from the 
planning initiative that among the four cases studies, only in the 
fourth one did the planning initiative come from the private sector. 
Therefore, generally, we can conclude that the public actors (central 
and city governments) continue to play a key role in the process, 
especially in consultation.  
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In the fourth case study, even though the developer had already 
received a permit letter from the Ministry of Public Works and the 
Ministry of Transportation, construction could not be started since 
the local network (city government of Jakarta and local council) could 
not make a decision without a presidential decree. This suggests that 
decisions in PPP projects have to be linked to various different 
actors, arenas, and networks, which constitutes not only an 
organizational problem in terms of management but also a domain 
problem (Klijn & Teisman, 2003).  
In this framework, a specific role can be identified for network 
analysis. Network analyses are becoming an increasingly significant 
aspect of the governmental praxis as planning and policy designs 
move further and further from coercive centralized methods toward 
the more flexible and complex public management strategies 




This chapter examined the decision-making process of infrastructure 
through PPPs. The conclusion drawn was that it has become more 
complex. Based on a preliminary analysis of four case studies in 
Indonesian PPP projects, the study found evidence that in recent 
cases, in line with social and environmental changes, decision 
making could be seen as a series of rounds where decisions are taken 
in various arenas as a series of interactions among multiple actors 
involved in the network.    
One of the apparent implications is that network analyses are 
also becoming increasingly significant for the planning and decision 
making of infrastructure in the current era of governance. The 
perspective of governance as network steering (Klijn & Koppenjan, 
2000; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004) recommends the participation of 
stakeholders in policymaking because of the interdependency 
between actors. Government and business, both control sources that 
are necessary to spatial investments and other policy (Oosten & 
Esselbrugge, 2004).  
From this point of view, the design of policymaking for 
infrastructural investment and PPPs particularly should be more 
sensitive to the real characteristics of the decision-making process. 
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Retrieved on February 09, 2009 from http://www.bpjt.net 
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Appendix 3.2 Interview Guide 
 
 
Two types of interview guides were used for this research: (1) An 
interview guide for the macro policy perspective, intended for policy 
makers to get information on the overall infrastructure policy 
process, and (2) An interview guide for project-specific processes, 
intended to get data and information on the project decision-making 
process (specifically as case studies).  
 
(1) Interview guide for general overview of the infrastructure 
decision making process   
 
Planning Process 
 How is the planning of infrastructure done in your 
institution? Who has the responsibility?  
 Does the planning result in a written document?   
 
Budgeting and Financing Process 
 How is the process of budgeting and financing in relation to 
infrastructure done? 
 Who is involved in the process? 
 
Infrastructure Data 
 How is infrastructure data managed in your institution? 
 What type of data is still missing and considered necessary? 
 
Governance 
 What obstacles and challenges occur in the planning, 
budgeting and financing of infrastructure? 
 Are you satisfied with the policy-making process for 
infrastructure? Is there any recommendation you would make 
to improve it? 
   
(2) Interview guide for the decision-making process of selected 
infrastructure projects (case studies)  
 
Historical aspects 
 Would you like to explain the history of the project (starting 
from the idea and proposal of the project)? 
 
Policy Formulation and Adoption 
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 In your opinion (or that of your institution), do you (or your 
institution) think the project is necessary? Would you like to 
explain why? 
 Was the project the only solution? Were there any alternatives 
to be considered?  
  
Planning Process 
 If your institution was involved in the planning process, how 
was the planning of the project done in your institution? Who 
had the responsibility? 
 
Budgeting and Financing Process 
 How was the budgeting and financing of the project done? 
 
Strands of Activities 
 Starting from the idea/initiative for this project, what 
problems and issues did you face?  
 How did you (or your institution) respond to those issues and 
problems? 
 During the process, were any non-technical issues (such as 
social, political etc.) raised? 
 
Study, Data and Method 
 Was any study done by your institution as a background to, or 
to support the decision of the project? Who conducted the 
study?  
 Has any other study been done or directed by other 
institutions? Does it reach similar results and conclusion? 
 
Governance 
 What institutions or players were involved in the decision-
making process of this project? What was the role of each of 
the institutions? 
 How did you (or your institution) manage the relationship 
with the other players? 
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Deputy Minister for Infrastructure and Regional Development, 
Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs 
 
Ir. Dedy Krisnariawan Sunoto 
Investment Division PT Jasa Marga (SOE of toll road operator) 
 
Hisnu Pawenang 
Board Chairman, Indonesia Toll Road Authority (BPJT) 
 
Lalu A. Damanhuri 
Infrastructure Consultant, Committee on Policy for the Acceleration 
of Infrastructure (KKPPI) 
 
Ir. Rido Matari Ichwan, MCP 
Head of Programming and Budgeting Division, Bureau of Planning 
and International Cooperation, Ministry of Public Works 
 
Pandu Gunadi A. ST. MUM 
Head of Subdivision Programming and Budgeting II, Bureau of 
Planning and International Cooperation, Ministry of Public Works 
 
Sutono 
Head of Data and Information, Directorate General of Highways, 
Ministry of Public Works 
 
Zulfikri 
Planning Division, Research and Development Agency, Ministry of 
Transportation 
 
Lukas B. Sihombing 
Assistant Manager, PT Citra Marga Nusphala Persada (Private toll 
road company) 
 
Dedy Gunawan, ST, MSc. 
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Directorate of Urban Road and Toll Road, Ministry of Public Works 
 
Ir. Rahman Arief Dienaputra, M.Eng 
Chief of Section of Policy and Strategy, Directorate of Planning, 
Directorate General of Highways, Ministry of Public Works 
 
Hasan Basri 
Regional Development Planning (Bappeda), Jakarta  
 
Sayogo 




Manager, PT CMNP 
 
Trijono Junoasmono 
Directorate General of Highways, Ministry of Public Works 
 
William Wallace 
Lead Economist, World Bank, Jakarta 
 
M Akbar 
Transportation office, Regional government city of Jakarta  
 
Sylvia Ananda 
Transportation office, Regional government city of Jakarta  
 
Listiyaning Handayani 




Operation & Portfolio 
Representative Office in Jakarta 




Indonesian Industrial Estate Association (HKI) 
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Congress member: contacted but unable to meet  
 
 
